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STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Appeal, instant, of decision of a Habeas Corpus, comes before the Utah 
Supreme Court by way Appeal by right; and, by jurisdictional authority 
pursuant to Utah Codes Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 2, Section 2, 
Subparagraph(s) (3)(j); and by, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 
42; and by assignment from the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Whether trial court, by applying incorrect standard of review for 
sufficiency of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus based upon errant 
factual findings and flawed reasoning, denied petitioner 
Constitutionally protected liberty rights of petitioning for redress, 
equal protection, and due process, under the law. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant on December 28, 1999, filed with the trial court a Complaint 
and Petition for an Article I, Section 5, Utah Constitution, Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, along with accompanying Administrative Notice of Due 
Process, and a blank Writ of Habeas Corpus to be issued. The Petition 
contained complaints that two County ordinances, when applied to 
Appellant, were in violation of Appellants' liberty right(s) secured 
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under the State Constitution; and after having suffered for a term of 
time, sought to challenge the legality of the ordinances. 
Appellant discovered and asked the court to interlineate two 
typographical corrections; but was informed to file a pleading for the 
corrections. Appellant was told, by Clerk of the Court, the judge had 
set the petition aside, "because he was going to have to do research." 
Appellant revisited Clerk of Court on January 5, 2000, and learned the 
judge ordered her to make a copy of the file so personal research of the 
Petition could be performed while away from court. 
Appellant filed an amended Administrative Notice with the Clerk of the 
Court on January 7, 2000, and asked to have it faxed to the judge so the 
judge would be aware of the numerous examples and court cites for due 
process and the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
On January 10, 2000, Appellant filed with the trial Court, a Notice of 
the Court's Refusal to Issue Habeas Corpus by Neglect. 
On January 11, 2000, a ruling was entered by the Court, which appeared 
to address only one of two issues of restraint, and in which the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were intertwined in a confusing 
manner. The trial court's findings, decipherable at best, were: 
1. Relief by Habeas Corpus is not available where relief is otherwise 
available; 
2. It is a general prerequisite, in both Common Law and Equity (Rule 
65B of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) , was that petitioner be 
restrained by commitment; 
3. And there must exist a case in controversy, which affects the 
parties (presumably the petitioner) rights. 
6 
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And the trial court's Conclusions of Law stated: 
1. Appellant presented no case in controversy; 
2. Had not exhausted all available remedies; 
3. Insufficient setting forth facts for prima facie case; 
4 . No controversy alleged 
5. And, therefore the Petition was frivolous. 
Petition was dismissed by court as frivolous, and notice of appeal filed 
by Appellant. On March 6, 2000, notice was given by the Utah Supreme 
Court the case had been transferred from the Utah Court of Appeals 
Appellant seeks review and challenges: (1) the trial Court's findings 
of facts; and, (2) the trial Court's conclusions of Law; (3) dismissal 
of Petition on the grounds of being frivolous. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Whether trial court, by using erroneous findings of fact(s) and 
inappropriately applied law, imposed an incorrect standard of judicial 
review for sufficiency of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; and, 
thereby denied petitioner Constitutionally protected liberty rights of 
petitioning for redress, equal protection, and due process, under the 
law. 
STATEMENT OF STANDARD OR SCOPE OF REVIEW 
The trial court's interpretation of Constitution, statutes, rules, and 
ordinances is a question of law, and is plenarily reviewed for cor-
rectness (State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993)), giving no 
7 
9/5/00 Appellant Brief 
deference to t r i a l c o u r t ' s conc lus ions . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s f ind ings of 
f a c t ( s ) are reviewable for c o r r e c t n e s s . 
ARGUMENT 
I. Did the District Court commit clear and reversible error by applying 
an incorrect standard of review to Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus? 
A: Without violating due process or equal protection of 
the law, may the District Court either disregard 
Higher Court rulings or general principles of law, 
and substitute its own standard for review of a 
Petition for Habeas Corpus to deny relief under the 
guise of being frivolous? 
1 
(A) 
The trial Court's finding of fact that "Relief by Habeas Corpus is not 
available where relief is otherwise available" is only a somewhat 
accurate statement. Granted, under United States Code, one attacking a 
sentence, must first move trial court to set aside or appeal a denial 
(28 U.S.C. 2255); but the availability of other remedies does not serve 
generally to bar issuance of Habeas Corpus to a petitioner in other 
matters (Ex Parte Kuney, 5 NYS.2d 644; affd, 280 NY 794; 21 NE.2d 621 
(1938)). The attributes of having to first file a motion to set aside 
or appeal is not applicable to the facts of case instant, as case 
instant is not a case of having been convicted and sentenced, but a case 
about denial of services deemed to be necessities of life by imposition 
of a county ordinance. 
Although Ex Parte Kuney is not a Utah state case, a reasoned, rational 
and logical argument can be made that the Constitutional rights, 
8 
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privileges or immunities found and protected by the highest court in any 
state are unenumerated rights, privileges and immunities in any other 
state. In Utah, visa via, the Constitution of the United States is the 
Supreme law of the land, (Article I, Section 3); all enumerated and 
unenumerated rights of the Federal Constitution (Amendment IX) are, at 
least, unenumerated rights in Utah (Article I, Section 25); and are, by 
definition, fundamental principles essential to the security of 
individual rights (Article I, Section 27); to be mandatorily protected, 
unless expressly declared otherwise (Article I, Section 26; see also, 
Official Proceedings and Debates of the Convention for the Constitution 
for the State of Utah (1895), Volume 1, page 360, for original meaning 
of this section). Thus any constitutional or judicial right, privilege 
or immunity created in any other state, by the same application is, at 
least, an unenumerated right, privilege or immunity of the people of 
Utah, to be protected by any officer of the state who has an oath of 
office swearing, to support, obey and defend the Constitution of the 
United States [of America] and the Constitution of this State, and to 
discharge their duties with fidelity (Article IV, Section 10) . Hence, 
if it is a general principle in a sister state that availability of 
other remedy does not bar Habeas, then it is well to be a general 
principle in Utah; and if in Utah, then binding on the Eighth District. 
(B) 
The petitioning for a Writ of Habeas requires the attachment of an 
Affidavit attesting to the truthfulness of the statement contained 
therein, by either first-hand knowledge or belief. The Petition 
correctly states in two different locations of having exhausted 
9/5/00 Appellant Brief 
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administrative remedy. Yet the trial court, admitting there is "an 
affirmative representation" of administrative remedies having been 
exhausted, immediately denies the presumption of law that statements of 
an affidavit are to be considered true unless or until refuted; and 
found "the facts [alleged] do not suggest that such is the case." What 
facts? The record reflects no facts refuting the affidavit—unless they 
were imaginary facts—introduced improperly by the trial court, to the 
trial court. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Moore v. East Cleveland (431 US 494, 
497, fn. 5 (1977)}, when expounding on the principle of exhaustion, said 
that it [exhaustion] would never foreclose a criminal defendant from 
asserting constitutional invalidity of the statute under which defendant 
was being prosecuted [or restrained]. By the same reasoning, a parallel 
argument may be made relating to "asserting constitutional invalidity" 
of an ordinance by which one is being restrained. Both constitute 
challenges of constitutionality, if one is acceptable, then so must the 
other. 
Plain, Speedy and adequate remedy are: 
SPEEDY REMEDY: One which, having in mind the subject-matter 
involved, can be pursued with expedition and without 
essential detriment to the party aggrieved (State v. 
District Court of Thirteenth Judicial District In and for 
Yellowstone County, 50 Mont 289; 146 P. 743, 745). 
ADEQUATE: Sufficient; proportionate; equally efficient; equal to 
what is required; suitable to the case or occasion; 
satisfactory (Nagle v. City of Billings, 11 Mont 205; 250 P. 
445, 446). Equal to some given occasion or work {Nissen v. 
Miller, 44 NM 487; 105 P.2d 324, 326). Commensurate; it 
does not mean average or graduation (Vandermade v. Appert, 
125 NJ.Eq 366; 5 A.2d 868, 871). 
ADEQUATE REMEDY: One vested in the complainant, to which he may 
at all times resort at his own option, fully and freely, 
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without let or hindrance {Wheeler v. Bedford, 54 Conn 244; 7 
A 22; State ex rel Heirnov v, Thomson, 131 Conn 8; 37 A. 2d 
689, 692. Suitable, proportionate, or sufficient {Fischer 
v. Damm, 36 Ohio App. 515; 173 NE 449, 451). A remedy which 
is plain and complete and as practical and efficient to the 
ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy 
in equity (Farmers & Traders Bank v. Kendrick, 341 Mo 571; 
108 SW.2d 62, 64) . A remedy that affords complete relief 
with reference to the particular matter in controversy, and 
is appropriate to the circumstances of the case {State v. 
Huwe, 103 Ohio 546; 134 NE 456, 459) . A remedy to be 
adequate, precluding resort to mandamus, must not only be 
one placing relator in status quo, but must itself enforce 
in some way performance of the particular duty {State v. 
Erickson, 104 Conn 542, 133 A 683, 686); must reach end 
intended, and actually compel performance of duty in 
question {Buchanan v. Buchanan, 124 Va 255; 6 SE.2d 612, 
620). Must be plain, accurate, certain, speedy, specific, 
and appropriate to the particular circumstances, and must 
also be equally as convenient, beneficial, and effective 
{Simpson v. Williams Rural High School Dist., Tex.Civ.App.; 
153 SW.2d 852, 856). 
The definitions speak for themselves. To have plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy, (1) the complainant has to be able resort to the 
remedy, at his own option, fully and freely; (2) remedy can be pursued 
with expedition and without essential detriment to the party aggrieved; 
(3) is sufficient, proportionate, efficient, and equal to what is 
required; (4) is plain, complete, and practical in support of justice 
and its prompt administration; (5) without resorting to extra-ordinary 
measures; (6) places the relator in status quo. 
The trial Court correctly found issuance of the Writ is dependent upon 
there being "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy." 
Clearly, any restraint of liberty imposed, without recourse as would be 
imposed by sustaining of the trial court's ruling, can have no plain, 
nor speedy, nor adequate remedy—effectively no remedy at all, if the 
restraint (and restraining party) can not be challenged, even with 
9/5/00 Appellant Brief 
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extra-ordinary measures. 
Thus the trial court erred in the presumption that "petitioner seeks a 
remedy which is contrary to the law;" as the "law is made to prevent the 
stronger from having the power to everything" (Common Law Maxim, Davies' 
Reports, Irish King's Bench), and "an act of law shall prejudice no man" 
(II Institutes, Coke on Magna Charta and Old Acts); as the "law" can not 
bar constitutional challenges. 
2. 
The trial Court's finding of, "It is a general prerequisite, in Common 
Law that petitioner be restrained by commitment" is an incorrect 
statement of judicial fact. As far back in history as 1722 {R. v. 
Clarkson, 93 Eng. Rep. 625) it was not required to show the person to be 
produced by a Habeas to be physically confined by a jailer, much less by 
commitment. As noted in the Administrative Notice, again in 1841 {R. v. 
Bridgeman et al., 174 Eng. Rep. 503) it is demonstrated that physical 
custody, by commitment or not, was not required, but it was sufficient 
to show an individual was not at liberty to go where they pleased. And 
yet again, in the Notice, it is pointed out, that in 1973, the United 
States Supreme Court announced one "only need be subject to a restraint 
not shared by the public in general" (Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 US 
345, 351, fn. 8). Having been noticed and in possession of cites, it is 
clear the trial was made fully aware of these cases. Additionally, the 
United States Supreme Court articulated the following analysis: 
History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that 
besides physical imprisonment (emphasis added), there 
9/5/00 Appellant Brief 
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are other restraints (emphasis added) on a man's liberty, 
restraints not shared by the public generally, which have 
been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to 
support the issuance of Habeas Corpus restrain[t of] 
petitioner's liberty to do those things which in this 
country free men are entitled to do. Such restraints are 
enough to invoke the help of the "Great Writ'7 (emphasis 
added){Jones v. Cunningham, 371 US 236, 240 (1963)). 
These cases, from 200 years ago to the present, are in diametric 
opposition to the findings of the trial court; and those cases from 
the United States Supreme Court are the standards to which all Judges 
are to adhere (Federal Constitution, Article VI, Section 2), not the 
pursuit of the trial court's private agenda. 
Without violating equal protection or due process of 
the law, may the District Court substitute its own 
more stringent definitions of legal terms and 
principles of law to deny issuance of a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus under the guise of being frivolous 
based upon the District Court's new definition? 
Prima facie: evidence of a fact, is in law sufficient to establish the 
fact, unless rebutted. 
A Law Dictionary Adapted To The Constitution And 
Laws Of The United States Of America And Of The 
Several States Of The American Union With 
References To The Civil And Other Systems Of 
Foreign Law, by John Bouvier, Entered according 
to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand 
eight hundred and fifty-two, by Eliza Bouvier and 
Robert E. Peterson, Trustees, in the Clerk's 
Office of the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. 
Given the principle of law that statements in an affidavit are presumed 
to be true, unless or until refuted, any statement or claim in a 
Petition, in affidavit form, is prima facie evidence of the particular 
13 
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fact attested. 
Perusal of the Petition, shows the Petition states a claim of restraint 
of constitutional right to exercise right to life and right and of 
contract, by an ordinance which requires a building permit before one 
can contract for utilities which are commonly and generally agreed upon 
as necessities of life. Continuing on, it states the life-threatening 
conditions endured. The conditions attested in the Petition were 
physically verifiable and would support the statement claiming 
restraint. If the trial Court, sua sponte, determines one-half of a 
claim is false, when used to deny a Petition as frivolous, why not 
determine the other half to be true which is favorable to issuance? 
The principle espoused in Coffin v. Reichared, (143 F.2d 443, (1944)} is 
that a petition is not be scrutinized with technical niceties, but 
should liberally be applied; and the doctrine in Mallory v. Follette, 
(391 US 917 (1967)) and Harris v. Nelson, (394 US 286 (1969)) where it 
is stated that Petitioners in Habeas proceedings are entitled careful 
consideration and plenary processing of their claims, including full 
opportunity for presentation of relevant facts, and only in this way is 
both the petitioner and respondent able to have a full and fair 
opportunity to present their positions. 
The trial Court's imposition, of it's new definition, that to be prima 
facie, one has to add adjunctive facts, is contrary to each of these 
doctrines in that it requires more than "a short, plain statement of the 
facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief (Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 65B (3) ) . How much more plain, and concise, 
without arguments or authorities, can one be than stating simply: "I am 
14 
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restrained of my xxx and yyy constitutional rights and I have suffered 
thus and such?" 
2. 
That some kind of restraint in action is required is a sound finding of 
the trial court and in accordance with prevailing holdings of law. The 
question, then, is what is the standard for determining liberty, so one 
may know when one is not at liberty, and is restrained? 
The full text of the Constitutional definition of liberty, as defined in 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary is: 
LIBERTY. Freedom from restraint. The power of acting as one thinks 
fit, without any restraint or control, except from the 
laws of nature. 
• Liberty is divided into civil, natural, personal, and 
political. 
• Civil liberty is the power to do whatever is permitted 
by the constitution of the state and the laws of the 
land. It is no other than natural liberty, so far 
restrained by human laws, and no further, operating 
equally upon all the citizens, as is necessary and 
expedient for the general advantage of the public. 
• Natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all 
mankind, of disposing of their persons and property 
after the manner they judge most consonant to their 
happiness, on condition of their acting within the 
limits of the law of nature, and that they do not in any 
way abuse it to the prejudice of other men. 
• Personal liberty is the independence of our actions of 
all other will than our own. It consists in the power of 
locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's 
person to whatever place one's inclination may direct, 
without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course 
of law. 
• Political liberty may be defined to be, the security by 
which, from the constitution, form and nature of the 
established government, the citizens enjoy civil 
liberty. No ideas or definitions are more 
distinguishable than those of civil and political 
liberty, yet they are generally confounded. The 
political liberty of a state is based upon those 
9/5/00 Appellant Brief 
fundamental laws which establish the distribution of 
legislative and executive powers. The political liberty 
of a citizen is that tranquillity of mind, which is the 
effect of an opinion that he is in perfect security; and 
to insure this security, the government must be such 
that one citizen shall not fear another. 
This definition and the definition given in the Notice are in agreement 
and are quite different, when read as a whole, than the definition 
attempted to be imposed by the findings of the Court, where liberty does 
not "envision that personal liberty would exempt individuals from all 
extraneous control or that a citizen has an unfettered right to follow 
the dictates of his unrestricted choice," and then lists specific rights 
in the Utah Constitution, of acquisition and enjoyment of property, of 
protest against wrongs, of petitioning for redress (Article I, Section 
1); of contracts (Article I, Section 18); of prosecuting and defending 
civil causes (Article I, Section 11) as being too broad. 
The trial court, in its pretextual extraction of the definition, in an 
attempt to distort the intent of the petition, eliminated the 
restrictive sentence that follows. That restrictive sentence states: 
"'freedom to enjoy to the fullest extent the privileges and immunities 
given or assured to the people living within the union of the united 
States of America." Clearly, text without context is pretext. 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th1 Edition (1968)) defines liberty even more 
broadly (a copy is attached in the appendix). 
Incorrect Standard of Review — Conclusion 
The trial Court, by substituting its own more stringent standards of 
•16 
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review for a Petition of Habeas Corpus has committed clear error, 
violated due process and equal protection under the law: (1) either by 
deliberating distorting law and facts in its attempt to declare the 
Petition frivolous; or, (2) by the Court being incompetent and not 
empowered to enforce due process and equal protection. 
II. Did the District Court commit reversible error by denying issuance 
Writ of Habeas Corpus based upon falleous Conclusions of Law? 
A: Without violating due process of law, may the Court, lacking 
foundation in law, dismiss allegations contained in complaint for 
Petition 
1. 
Controversy arises when allegations are made, and cease when either, (a) 
one party fails to answer, or (b) controversy is heard by a finder of 
facts and judgement entered. In Alewine v. Missouri, (352 F.Supp, 1190 
(1975)), the Court held that "once a petitioner alleges he has been 
denied constitutional rights, [the] government ... is subject to a heavy 
burden of going forward to prove the petitioner knowingly, 
intentionally, and voluntarily waived those rights." 
In Ex Parte Dillon, (186 P 170, 172 (1919)), the Court held "the burden 
of proof, of justifying the legality of detention or restraint is on the 
public servant depriving the petitioner of his liberty" (emphasis 
added). 
The indicia of Alewine v. Missouri and Ex Parte Dillon, indicate that 
controversy clearly arises upon claim of denial [restraint] of 
constitutional rights. This, in contradistinction to the findings of 
the trial court that the petitioner complains of "the mere existence of 
certain county ordinances;" and "has not presented a case in 
controversy," indicates the petitioner did raise a controversy with a 
"mere" allegation of denial of constitutional rights by claiming 
application of county ordinance violated Petitioner's constitutionally 
protected liberty. 
9/5/00 Appellant Brief 
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The trial court erroneously found that the Petition failed to set forth 
facts which show that petitioner has be adversely affected by the 
ordinance. Under Section II, page 4, of the Petition, petitioner 
clearly states the affect of restraint of liberty rights by imposition 
of the ordinance against petitioner caused the petitioner to live 
without heat in life threatening temperatures. And the Petition 
continues on, to define in footnote 1, what the life threatening 
temperatures were — minus 25 degrees internal to the structure and 
minus 39 degree externally. 
It doesn't matter whether there is one or a hundred facts to support 
allegations or affects, and the findings of the trial court 
notwithstanding; allegations of claim of denial [restraint] of 
constitutional rights, supported by claims of the affects from 
restraint, is a prima facie case which would entitle petitioner to 
remedy and is in harmony with the finding of Alewine v. Missouri and Ex 
Parte Dillon. 
2. 
According to Urquhart v. Lockhart, (726 F.2d 1316 (1984) a Habeas 
Petition may not be dismissed, unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief. 
Sua sponte investigation, by the trial court, of only references in 
favor of one of the parties to a suit is a clear violation of due 
process. The trial Court admits researching the "ordinances" but does 
not state it researched the temperatures asserted in support of the 
effects of the alleged restraint (and by its own logic, it must not have 
done any research) . The claim of the temperatures, if the trial 
wanted, could have been as easily verified as the ordinances. But the 
rather, the trial Court denied the petition based partly, upon failure 
of "show[ing] that he had been adversely affected by an ordinance." 
In the spirit of the holding in Harris v. Nelson, (394 US 286 (1969)) 
the "petitioners in Habeas proceedings are entitled to careful and 
plenary processing of their claims." The trial Court, in sua sponte 
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investigation of one thing and avoiding investigation of another, is in 
clear violation of due process for review of sufficiency. 
Even granting the trial Court applied Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 65B, (applying equity, to a common law petition); the rule 
prohibits arguments and citations, but requires a short plain statement 
of the facts. How much more plain can a statement of fact be, than 
"restraint by A, caused B affect," as in the Petition? 
Incorrect Application of Law — Conclusion 
The trial Court, by applying its own derivative of law in review of a 
Petition of Habeas Corpus, has committed clear error by violating due 
process and equal protection under the law: (1) either deliberating 
distorting law and facts in its attempt to declare the Petition 
frivolous to forward its own agenda; or, (2) the Court is incompetent 
and fails in its duty to enforce due process and equal protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental principle of fairness requires consistent application of 
accepted principles and rules of law. This principle is called the rule 
of law. Strict adherence to the established procedures is due process 
and affords equal protection under the law; and precludes the 
introduction of variations and deviations, however small, lacking 
exigent circumstances. 
Once having introduced unwarranted variations and deviations, violation 
of due process and equal protection occurs. It is the duty of citizens 
and of the Courts to guard against the stealthy encroachment of rights 
(Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 (1886)), by violations of due process 
and equal protection, which if left unchallenged and unchecked, leads to 
the common denial of the exercise of those rights and to eventual 
extinction of what was once a secured right. 
Aside from the Common Law, the Legislatures (Federal and State) and the 
Judicial Rules Committees have established a balwark for review of a 
19 
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Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Such is Rule 65B; and such are 
the variations and deviations introduced in the case instant that it is 
to guard against. 
1. 
The following is a side-by-side representation of the standard of review 
asserted by the trial Court, the standard set by Rule 65B, and even 
though the Petitioner acted under the Common Law, claiming right a 
Constitutional Habeas Corpus, the Petitioner's actions to the standard 
set in Rule 65B. 
COMPARISON OF STANDARDS OF "ON ITS FACE" REVIEW OF A PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS AS LISTED IN RULE 65B 
| Trial Court Standard 
Prima facie case; 
retaining judicial 
ability to deny 
truthfulness of 
selected statements 







Rule 65B Standard 
A short, plain 
statement of fact on 
the basis of which the 
petitioner seeks 
relief; attested to by 
oath and presumed to 
be true. 
No argument or 
authorities in 
petition, but in 
memorandum 
Identify Respondent(s) 
Identify place of 
restraint 
Pretense of restraint, 
if known by petitioner 
Prior adjudicative 
proceedings, with copy 
Petitioner's Action 
Petition, a short 
plain statement of 
fact in affidavit 
Administrative Notice 
(for issuance of Writ, 
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Trial Court Standard 
8 days research and 
delay by the Court 
Rule 65B Standard 
If frivolous on face ... 
forthwith issue order 




Petitioner's Action \ 
Demand of issuance of 
Writ after 12 days 
delay 
Based on the above comparison, the ruling of the trial Court is not in 
accordance with equity Rule 65B(5) by neglecting when "any claim in the 
petition shall appear to be frivolous on its face, the court shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim ... and the reasons." As 
the record reflects, the trial Court, not forthwith, issued a ruling 
stating, "Based on the above, the petition is dismissed as being 
frivolous." 
And arriving at such a conclusion, apparently to the trial Court, "being 
frivolous on its face," clearly means, entails, and requires eight (8) 
days extra-judicial research before discovery and determination. 
2. 
The following is a side-by-side representation of the application of law 
as asserted by the trial Court and the standard set by other Judicial 
Authority. The Chart speaks for itself. 
COMPARISON OF STANDARDS OF LAW APPLICABLE TO REVIEW OF PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Trial Court Standard 
Court's prerequisite 
restraint by commitment; 




In 1722, not required to be to be 
physically restrained; In 1841 
sufficient to show an individual 
was not at liberty to go where they 
pleased; In 1973, the United States 
Supreme Court announcement "only 
need be subject to a restraint not 
shared by the public in general"; 
Such restraint is enough to invoke 
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Trial Court Standard 
Plead prima facie case, 
Court can deny any fact by 
fiat, or by cunning 
distortions of facts 
presented 
Mere existence of ordinance 
1 is not controversy 
Challenge of 
Constitutionally is not 
permitted — by law 
Correct Standard 
the help of the Great Writ 
Affidavit is acceptable evidence; \ 
Evidence of a fact, is sufficient 
to establish the fact, unless 
rebutted by facts of equal weight; 
Petition not dismissed, unless it ! 
appears beyond doubt that no set of i 
facts can be proved in support 
which would entitle relief; Plenary 
processing; Not be scrutinized with 
technical niceties, but liberally 
applied 
Once allegation of denied of 
constitutional right, [the] 
government ... is subject to a 
heavy burden of going forward to 
prove knowingly, intentional, and 
voluntarily waiver of rights; 
Once alleges denial of 
constitutional rights, [the] 
government ... is subject to a 
heavy burden of going forward to 
prove knowing, intentional, and 
voluntary waiver; those rights; 
Petition for Redress of grievances; 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental 
principles for security of rights 
Based upon the foregoing, it appears the trial did not read the 
attending Administrative Notice filed with the Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, imposed an incorrect standard of judicial review for 
sufficiency of Petition, and applied inappropriate rendering of law for 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; and, thereby denied Petitioner 
Constitutionally protected liberty rights of petitioning for redress, 
equal protection, and due process, under the law. Therefore the Supreme 
Court should reverse the ruling of the trial Court and remand the case 
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ADDENDUM 
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Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed (1968) 
LIBERTY. Freedom; exemption from extraneous control. Freedom 
from all restraints except such as are Justly Imposed by law. Ex 
parte Kreutzer, 187 Wis. 463, 204 N.W. 595, 604. Freedom from 
restraint, under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of 
the same right by others; freedom regulated by law, Kelly v. 
James, 37 S.D. 272, 157 N.W. 990, 991. The absence of arbitrary 
restraint, not Immunity from reasonable regulations and 
prohibitions Imposed In the Interests of the community. Southern 
Utilities Co. v. City of Palatka, 86 Fla. 583, 99 So. 236, 240; 
Nelson v. Tllley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388, 392, 126 A.L.R. 
729; Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P. 2d 
779, 785. 
The power of the will to follow the dictates of Its unrestricted 
choice, and to direct the external acts of the Individual without 
restraint, coercion, or control from other persons. See Booth v. 
Illinois, 22 S.Ct. 425, 184 U.S. 425, 46 L.Ed. 623; Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 142, 24 L.Bd. 77; People v. Warden of City 
Prison, 51 N.E. 1006, 157 N.Y. 116, 43 L.R.A. 264, 68 Am.StRep. 
763. 
The word "liberty" Includes and comprehends all personal rights 
and their enjoyment. Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 42 N.Y.S.2d 62 6, 
630, 181 Misc. 78. It embraces freedom from duress, In re Miner. 
D.C. III., 9 F.Supp, 1, 7; freedom from governmental Interference 
In exercise of Intellect, In formation of opinions, In the 
expression of them, and in action or Inaction dictated by 
Judgment, Zavilla v. Masse, 112 Colo. 183, 147 P.2d 823, 827; 
freedom from servitude, Imprisonment or restraint, Committee tor 
Industrial Organization v. Hague, D.C.N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 131, 
141; People v. Wood, 272 N.Y.S. 258, 151 Misc. 66: freedom in 
enjoyment and use of all of one's powers, faculties and property, 
Grosjean v. American Press Co., La., 56 S.Ct. 444, 446, 297 U.S. 
233, 80 L.Ed. 660; City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 III. 
447, 17 N.E.2d 52, 55, 119 A.L.R. 747; freedom of assembly, 
Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 626, 630, 181 Misc. 78; 
freedom of citizen from banishment, Committee for Industrial 
Organization v. Hague, D. C.N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 141; freedom of 
conscience, Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist., D.C.Pa., 21 
F.Supp. 581, 58 4, 587; freedom of contract, State ex rel. Hamby 
v, Cummings, 166 Tenn. 460, 63 S.W.2d 515; State v. Henry, 37 
N.M. 536, 25 P.2d 204, 90 A.L.R. 805; freedom of locomotion or 
movement, Commonwealth v. Doe, 109 Pa. Super. 187, 167 A. 241, 
242; Committee for Industrial Organization v. Hague, D. C.N.J., 
25 F.Supp. 127, 131, 141; freedom of occupation, Koos v. 
Saunders, 349 HI. 442, 182 N.E. 415, 418; freedom of press, 
:ommonwealth v. Nichols, 301 Mass. 584, 18 N.E.2d 166, 167; Near 
J. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson (Minn.) 51 S.Ct. 625, 628, 
283 U.S. 697, 75 L.Ed. 1357; freedom of religion, Gabrielli v. 
Knickerbocker, 12 Cal.2d 85, 82 P.2d 391, 393; Hamilton v. 
:ity of Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 124 P.2d 757, 759; Cantwell v. 
State of Connecticut, Conn., 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, SIO U.S. 29&, 84 
L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352; freedom of speech, Ghadiall v. 
Delaware State Medical Soc, D.C.Del., 28 F.Supp. 841, 844; 
Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213, v. 
Ritter's Cafe, Tex., 62 S.Ct. 807, 809, 315 U.S. 722, 86 L.Ed. 
1143. It also embraces right of self-defense against unlawful 
violence, Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 121 Pa. Super. 281. 184 
A. 133, 136; right to acquire and enjoy property, Rohrer v. Milk 
Control Board, 121 Pa. Super. 281, 184 A. 133, 136; right to 
acquire useful knowledge, Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 42 N.Y.S.2d 
626, 630, 181 Misc. 78: right to carry on business, Mile, Reif, 
Inc., v, Randau, I N.Y.S.2d 515, 518, 166 Misc. 247; right to 
earn livelihood in any lawful calling. Saidel v. Village of 
Tupper Lake, 4 N.Y.S.2d 814, 818, 254 App.DIv. 22; right to 
emigrate, and If a citizen, to return, Committee for Industrial 
Organization v. Hague, D. C.N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 141; right to 
engage In a lawful business, to determine the price of one's 
labor, and to fix the hours when one's place of business shall be 
kept open, State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 
552, 44 N.E.2d 972, 980; right to enjoy to the fullest extent 
the privileges and Immunities given or assured by law to people 
living within the country, McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 
Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 611; right to forswear allegiance and 
expatriate oneself, Committee for Industrial Organization v. 
Hague, D.C. N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 141; right to freely buy and 
sell as others may, Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 121 Pa. Super. 
281, 184 A. 133, 136; right to labor, Simon v. Schwachman, 301 
Mass. 573, 18 N.E. 2d 1, 3; right to live and work where one will. 
People v. Wood, 272 N.Y.S. 258. 151 Misc. 66; right to marry and 
have a family. Committee tor Industrial Organization v. Hague, 
D.C.N. J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 141; Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 42 
N.Y.S.2d 626, 630, 181 Misc. 78; right to pursue chosen calling. 
State v. Chlsesi, 187 La. 675, 175 So. 453; People v. Cohen, 8 
N.Y.S.2d 70, 72, 255 App.DIv. 485; right to use property 
according owner's will, State Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of 
Wllmette, 358 III. 311, 193 N.E. 131, 133, 96 A.L.R. 1327. 
Liberty, on Its positive side, denotes the fullness of Individual 
existence; on Its negative side it denotes the necessary 
restraint on all, which Is needed to promote the greatest 
possible amount of liberty for each. Amos, Science of Law, 
p. 90. 
The word "liberty" as used In the state and federal Constitutions 
means. In a negative sense, freedom from restraint, but In a 
positive sense, It Involves the idea of freedom secured by the 
imposition of restraint, and it is In this positive sense that 
the state. In the exercise of Its police powers, promotes the 
freedom of all by the Imposition upon particular persons of 
restraints which are deemed necessary for the general welfare. 
Fitzsimmons v. New York State Athletic Commission, Sup., 146 
N.Y.S. 117, 121. 
"Liberty," In so far as It is noticed by government, Is 
restraint, rather than license. It Is a yielding of the 
Individual will to that of the many, subject to such 
constitutional guarantees or limitations as will preserve 
those rights and privileges which are admitted of all men to be 
fundamental. "Liberty" In the civil state is a giving up of 
natural right In consideration of equal protection and 
opportunity. Weber v. Doust, 84 Wash. 330, 146 P. 623, 625. 
The "personal liberty" guaranteed by Const. U. S. Amend. 13 
consists In the power of locomotion without Imprisonment or 
restraint unless by due course of law, except those restraints 
Imposed to prevent commission of threatened crime or In 
punishment of crime committed, those In punishment of contempts 
of courts or legislative bodies or to render their Jurisdiction 
effectual, and those necessary to enforce the duty citizens owe 
In defense of the state to protect community against acts of 
those who by reason of mental Infirmity are Incapable of self-
control. Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W.Va. 526, 103 S.E. 327, 329, 9 
A.L.R. 1361. 
The "liberty" safeguarded by Fourteenth Amendment Is liberty In a 
social organization which requires the protection of law against 
the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare 
of the people. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, Wash., 57 S.Ct. 
578, 581, 582, 300 U.S. 379, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330. 
Also, a franchise or personal privilege, being some part of the 
sovereign power, vested in an individual, either by grant or 
prescription. 
The term Is used In the expression, rights, liberties, and 
franchises, as a word of the same general class and meaning with 
those words and privileges. This use of the term is said to have 
been strictly conformable to Its sense as used In Magna Charta 
and In English declarations of rights, statutes, grants, etc.; 
Corn. v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 70. 
In a derivative sense, the place, district, or boundaries within 
which a special franchise is enjoyed, an immunity claimed, or a 
jurisdiction exercised. In this sense, the term is commonly used 
in the plural; as the "liberties of the city." 
Civil Liberty 
The liberty of a member of society, being a man's natural 
liberty, so far restrained by human laws (and no further) as is 
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the 
public. I Bl. Comm. 125; 2 Steph. 487 
The power of doing whatever the laws permit. I Bl. Comm. 6; 
Inst. 1, 3, 1. See Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537, 52 P. 333, 
40 L.R.A. 302. The greatest amount of absolute liberty which 
can, In the nature of things, be equally possessed by every 
citizen In a state. Guarantied protection against 
Interference with the Interests and rights held dear and 
Important by large classes of civilized men, or by all the 
members of a state, together with an effectual share In the 
making and administration of the laws, as the best apparatus 
to secure that protection. Lieber, Civ.Lib. 24. 
Liberty of Contract 
The ability at will, to make or abstain from making, a binding 
obligation enforced by the sanctions at the law. Judson, 
Liberty of Contract, Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n (1891) 233. 
The right to contract about one's affairs, Including the right 
to make contracts of employment, and to obtain the best terms 
one can as the result of private bargaining. Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital of District of Columbia, 43 S. Ct. 394, 
396, 261 U.S. 525, 67 L.Ed. 785, 24 A.L.R. 1238. It Includes 
the corresponding right to accept a contract proposed. St. 
Louis Southwestern Ry, Co. of Texas v. Griffin, 106 Tex. 477, 
171 S.W. 703, 704, L.R.A. 1917B, 1108. There is, however, no 
absolute freedom of contract. The government may regulate or 
forbid any contract reasonably calculated to affect Injuriously 
public Interest. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside 
Mills, 31 S.Ct. 164, 219 U.S. 186, 55 L.Ed. 167, 31 
L.R.A..N.S., 7; Carleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming, 
CCA.Minn., 126 F.2d 537, 541. It means freedom from 
arbitrary or unreasonable restraint, not immunity from 
reasonable regulation to safeguard public Interest, Saucier v. 
Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 189 Miss. 693, 198 So. 
625, 631; or the right to make contracts with competent persons 
on a plane of relative parity or freedom of choice and within 
the limits allowed or not forbidden by law. McGrew v. 
Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 612. 
Natural Liberty 
The power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or 
control, unless by the law of nature. I Bl. Comm. 125. 
The right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of 
their persons and property after the manner they Judge most 
consistent with their happiness, on condition of their acting 
within the limits of the law of nature, and so as not to 
Interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other 
men. Burlamaqui, c. 3, §15; I Bl. Comm. 125. It Is called by 
Lieber social liberty, and Is defined as the protection or 
unrestrained action In as high a degree as the same claim of 
protection of each Individual admits of. 
Personal Liberty 
The right or power of locomotion; of changing situation, or 
moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination 
may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due 
course of law. I Bl. Comm. 134. Civil Rights Cases, 3 S.Ct. 
42, 109 U.S. 3, 27 L.Ed. 835; Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 
573, 44 N.W. 579, 7 L.R.A. 507, 18 Am.StRep. 473. 
olitical Liberty 
Liberty of the citizen to participate In the operations of 
government, and particularly In the making and administration 
of the laws. 
eligious Liberty 
Freedom from dictation, constraint, or control in matters 
affecting the conscience, religious beliefs, and the practice 
of religion; freedom to entertain and express any or no system 
of religious opinions, and to engage in or refrain from any 
form of religious observance or public or private religious 
worship, not inconsistent with the peace and good order of 
society and the general welfare. See Frazee's Case, 63 Mich. 
396, 30 N.W. 72, 6 Arn-StRep. 310/ State v. White, 64 N.H. 48, 
5 A. 828. 
LIBEBUM EST CUIQUE APUD SE EXPLOBABE AN EXPEDIAT SIBI CONSILIUM. 
Every one is free to ascertain for himself whether a 
recommendation is advantageous to his interest. Upton v. Vail, 6 
Johns. (N.Y.) 181, 184, 5 Am.Dec. 210. 
